Serenity_Rat

Overview

Serenity RAT (cataloged across security software as Backdoor.Win32.Serenity, Trojan.Serenity, and Serenity RAT) is a mid-2000s Remote Access Trojan created in Borland Delphi by the Belgian developer known as 'Killua'. Built with modularity and operator usability in mind, Serenity RAT offered a polished graphical control center for managing infected endpoints simultaneously. The server payload operated stealthily in the background, utilizing multithreaded socket listeners to handle real-time screen capture, remote file transfers, and registry browsing. Serenity RAT featured comprehensive keylogging capabilities with offline buffer storage, process injection, remote shell execution, and hardware enumeration. To maintain persistence, the server wrote autostart keys to the Windows Registry and could inject into explorer.exe. Distributed across underground forums, Serenity RAT droppers leveraged CVE-2010-2568 and CVE-2012-0158.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Serenity RAT
• Backdoor.Win32.Serenity
• Serenity by Killua
• Win32/Serenity.RAT
• Trojan.Serenity

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Delphi Rat Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Serenity Rat V1.0 · Serenity Rat V1.2

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6
• 1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b

Delivery vectors

• Peer-to-peer file sharing networks disguised as software cracks and game cheat tools
• Exploitation of shortcut and document flaws including CVE-2010-2568 and CVE-2012-0158

Persistence mechanisms

• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SerenityServer
• Startup folder shortcut placed under %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_SERENITY_RAT_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Serenity_Rat"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "serenity_rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "serenity rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "backdoor.win32.serenity" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "serenity by killua" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/serenity.rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "trojan.serenity" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Serenity_rat (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 810e05c7-44e3-5c5a-b912-e5a6dada05ba
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Serenity_rat malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation
  via Windows Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative
  of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/serenity_rat
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1055_002
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1083
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_SERENITY_RAT_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Serenity_Rat tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "serenity_rat" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the affected endpoint from the local network to terminate active C2 control channels.
2. Inspect explorer.exe and active process trees for injected backdoor DLLs or unmapped memory regions.
3. Remove persistent startup entries in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
4. Deploy endpoint security tools to scan for and eliminate dropped payloads and registry modifications.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow unmonitored outbound TCP traffic to dynamic DNS domains commonly used by underground RAT controllers.
2. Avoid executing unknown executable files downloaded from hobbyist developer forums.

References & External Analysis

• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Backdoor.Win32.Serenity
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan.Win32.Serenity
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2010-2568
• Search "serenity_rat" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "serenity_rat" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "serenity_rat" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Quasar
• Gh0St
• Nanocore
• Hupigon
• Asyncrat
• Hav_Rat
• Icecold_Reloaded
• Cybergate

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/serenity_rat.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.